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STATEMENT OF ISSUES PRESENTED ON APPEAL
I.

Whether the Public Service Commission failed to

comply with the Utah Administrative Rulemaking Act, Utah Code
Ann,. § 63-46a-l, et seg. , thereby invalidating Commission Rule
No. 8304 which purports to eliminate the Commission's jurisdiction over one-way paging services.
II.

Whether

the Public

Service Commission

erred in

dismissing American Pagingfs Application for Certificate of Convenience

and Necessity

to operate a one-way telephone paging

service on the basis that the Commission no longer has jurisdiction to regulate paging services.
III. Whether the Public Utilities Act, Utah Code Ann.
§S 54-8b-l, et seg. (Supp. 1985),

impacts the Public Service

Commission's jurisdiction over one-way paging services.
STATEMENT OF FACTS
Since 1962, the Utah Public Service Commission ("Commission") has interpreted its regulatory authority over telephone
corporations and the services provided by them to include one-way
paging services.

In fact, in a predecessor case to this action,

this Court recently stated:
Understanding
the
history
of
the
Commission's assertion of regulatory authority over one-way paging services is important
to this case.
In 1962, the Commission
granted a Certificate of Public Convenience
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and Necessity to operate both a two-way
mobile telephone system and a one-way paging
service to petitioner Mobile Telephone, Inc.
By this action, and without objection from
any party, the Commission assumed jurisdiction over both one-way paging and two-way
mobile telephone services under Sections
54-2-1(21), (22), and (30) of the Code.
(Footnote omitted.)
Between 1962 and 1983
the Commission granted similar duel authority
certificates to three other companies.
In
1974, the Commission granted to Mobile Telephone of Southern Utah, Inc., a single
authority certificate covering only one-way
paging service. From the record, it appears
that the Commission has, on occasion, denied
requests for certificates for one-way paging
authority.
Until
1983, however,
the
Commission's authority to regulate one-way
paging services was not questioned.
Williams v. Public Service Commission, 720 P.2d 773, 774 (Utah
1986).
The case referred to above is of

interest not only

because of the light it sheds on the Commission's twenty-year
history of regulating one-way paging services, but also because
it plays an important procedural role in the history of the case
now before the Court.

The decision in Williams was the result

of an appeal filed by David Williams, petitioner herein, and

1 The opinion prepared by Justice Zimmerman and filed on March 4,
1986 in Williams v. Public Service Commission, 720 P.2d 773,
(Utah 1986) provides a thorough statement of the facts pertinent
to the initial appeal as well as to the present proceeding.
Petitioner will not restate those facts but simply directs the
Court's attention to its previous recital of the facts. A copy
of the Court's opinion is contained in Appendix A.
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other

certificated

providers

of

one-way

paging

service

in

response to action by the Commission which this Court determined
was an

improper

attempt

to deregulate one-way paging.

In

Williams, it was held that the Commission's attempts to deregulate one-way paging services constituted rulemaking and as such
were

subject

to

Rulemaking Act.

the

provisions

of

the

Utah

Administrative

The Commission's failure to comply with the

notice and hearing requirements of the Administrative Rulemaking
Act

required

which,

if

that
allowed

this Court
to

vacate

stand,

would

the Commission's
have

orders

eliminated

the

Commission's jurisdiction over one-way paging services, "effectively deregulating

that field."

Williams v. Public Service

Commission, 720 P.2d at 775.
Within weeks of the Court's opinion in Williams, the
Commission filed a notice of proposed rulemaking with the Office
of Administrative Rules, which purported to retroactively eliminate the Commission's jurisdiction over one-way paging.
of the notice simply stated:
The Public Service Commission of Utah does
not have jurisdiction over one-way paging
service.
The reason for the rule is that
one-way paging service does not fall within
the definition of a "telephone corporation"
in that such service does not utilize a
"telephone line."
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The body

This

notice

demonstrates

a

fundamental

mis-reading

of

this

Courtfs opinion in Williams and seeks to declare retroactively
"no jurisdiction" rather than prospectively to deregulate a long
regulated industry.

(A copy of the Notice of Proposed Rulemaking

is contained in Appendix B.)

Williams timely filed his objec-

tions to the Proposed Rule and requested a public hearing.
at 22)

(R.

The proposed rule was adopted without adequate notice to

all interested persons and without a hearing and made effective
as Rule No. 8304 on May 16, 1986.

(R. at 248)

On April 30, 1985, after having provided paging service
to the general public for nearly two years without authority,
American Paging filed an application with the Commission for a
Certificate of Convenience

and Necessity

to operate a public

utility rendering paging services in designated areas in Utah.
American Paging simultaneously
application

on

the

ground

filed a Motion

that

jurisdiction over one-way paging.

to Dismiss its

the Commission
(R. at 248).

did

not have

In an order

issued May 23, 1986, the Commission granted American Paging's
Motion to Dismiss its application for lack of jurisdiction. (R.
at 249) (See Appendix C ) .
By this appeal, petitioner David Williams seeks review
of the Commission's adoption of Rule No. 8304 and its dismissal
of "American Paging's application for lack of jurisdiction.
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SUMMARY OF THE ARGUMENT
The Commission's first attempt to deregulate one-way
paging services was vacated in Williams v. Public Service Commission, supra, for failure to comply with the requirements of
2
the Utah Administrative Rulemaking Act.

Its action in purport-

ing to adopt Rule No. 8304 is likewise invalid for, among other
things,

failure

to even

attempt

to /'deregulate" a regulated

industry and in failing to give adequate notice and an opportunity for a hearing.
The

Commission

clearly

misinterpreted

this

Court's

opinion in Williams since it did not even attempt to deregulate
paging

services.

It simply declared, retroactively, that it

"does not have jurisdiction over one-way paging services."

The

Commission's action is void on its face as a matter of law.
The Commission's attempt to give notice of the proposed
rule

change

was

inadequate

since

the

Williams came in a collateral proceeding.

only

notice

given

to

Moreover, it does not

appear from the record that notice was given to other interested
parties and to the very same non-parties to whom no notice was
given

in the prior proceeding

fatally defective

which

in Williams.

this Court

found

to be

Additionally, the notice was

2 The Court in Williams did not reach the substantive issues
which petitioner Williams maintains would have also prevented the
Commission from denying its jurisdiction over one-way paging
services.
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ineffective and void because it failed to set forth the reasons
and justifications for changing the longstanding rule previously
adhered to by the Commission and acknowledged by the Court in
Williams,

Utah law provides that radical departures from admin-

istrative interpretation consistently followed cannot be
except for the most cogent reasons.

made

Adoption of Rule No, 8304

represents a radical departure from the Commission's twenty year
old exercise of jurisdiction over one-way paging services, and
since

no

cogent

reasons

compelling

a

departure

from

the

Commission's longstanding practice were given, the rule should be
vacated ab initio.
Furthermore, the Commission is estopped from reversing
its long-standing practice of regulating one-way paging services.
The Commission originally assumed jurisdiction over one-way paging services by

issuing

certificates of necessity and public

convenience to Williams and others.

It then vigorously regulated

these certificate holders and tightly controlled entry for many
years.

Williams relied on these certificates by expending in

excess of a million dollars to develop a full service, sophisticated paging service which he would not have done but for the
certificates he received.
has suffered

As a result of Rule No. 8304, Williams

and will continue to suffer

injury as a direct

result of his reliance in good faith on the Commission's twenty
plus year history of regulating paging services.
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The certificates of public convenience and necessity
formerly issued by the Commission to Williams constitute valuable
property rights.

Because Rule No. 8304 effectively voids those

certificates, it follows that Williams has been deprived of his
property rights without compensation as required by substative
principles of due process.
ARGUMENT
I.
COMMISSION RULE NO. 8304 IS INVALID BECAUSE THE
COMMISSION FAILED TO COMPLY WITH JUDICIAL AND
LEGISLATIVE REQUIREMENTS FOR DEREGULATION
A.
The Commission's Attempt to Escape Regulation of
One-Way Paging is not in Accordance with the Utah Supreme Court's
Opinion in the Williams Case.
In Williams v. Public Service Commission, 720 P.2d 773
(Utah 1986), a case involving virtually the same dispute between
the same parties as this case, this Court concluded that "the
Commission cannot reverse its long-settled position regarding the
scope

of

its

jurisdiction

and

announce

a fundamental policy

change without following the requirements of the Utah Administrative Rulemaking Act."

Id.

at 777.

The legal and practical

effect of the Commission's order in Williams was to deregulate a
regulated industry by administrative fiat.

The Court noted:

Following the November hearing, the
Commission formally ruled that it had no
jurisdiction to regulate one-way paging services, effectively deregulating that field.
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720 P.2d at 775 (Emphasis added).

The Court continued:

[B]y deregulating the one-way paging market
and permitting open competition in the market, the decision altered the rights of all
certificate holders, despite their explicit
reliance on the Commission's prior interpretation.
id. at 776.
Instead

of

complying

with

the

Court's

mandate

in

Williams by seeking to "deregulate" this long regulated industry
in the future, the Commission summarily sought to wash its hands
of this subject by simply declaring retroactively that the Commission "does not have jurisdiction over one-way paging."
29).

(R. at

Petitioner submits that this recent action by the Commis-

sion flies directly into the face of this Court's admonition to
the Commission in Williams, is void on its face, and should be
vacated.

B.
The Commission Again Failed to Comply with the
Statutory Notice Requirements.
One

of

the

requirements

of

the

Administrative

Rulemaking Act, Utah Code Ann. § 63-46a-4 (1953) is that proper
notice be given to all interested parties:
(4) A copy of the rule analysis form shall be
mailed to all persons who have made timely
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request of the agency for advance notice of
its rulemaking proceedings, and to any other
person who, by statutory or federal mandate,
or in the judgment of the agency, should also
receive notice. (Emphasis added).
The only notice provided to Williams came as a result of Chairman
Cameron handing counsel for Williams a copy of Notice of Proposed
Rule Change during a scheduling conference in a collateral proceeding.

(R. at 24, 25). While the Commission purports to have

provided notice to "the parties" (R. at 236), the record is
silent as to the identities of those partiejs and to the manner in
which notice, if any, was provided. Besides Williams, all other
affected persons should have been given notice.
least,

that

should

include

one-way paging service.

all

holders

of

At the very

certificates

for

A primary reason the Commission's Order

in Williams was vacated was because adequate advance notice was
not

given

to

all

affected

parties,

including

non-parties.

Williams v. Public Service Commission, 720 P.2d at 777.

Simi-

larly, Commission Rule No. 8304 should be vacated.
Even though a "notice" was provided to Williams, it was
wholly inadequate in terms of what must be set forth in a Rule
Analysis Form.

Utah Code Ann. § 63-46a-4(3) (1953) states:

(3)

The rule analysis form shall contain:
(a) A summary of the rule of change;
(b) the purpose of the rule or reason
for the change;
(c) the statutory authority or federal
requirement for the rule;
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(d) the anticipated cost or savings to
the state budget and compliance costs for
affected persons;
(e) how interested persons may inspect
the full text of the rule;
(f) how interested persons may present
their views on the rule;
(g) the time and place of any scheduled
public hearing;
(h) the name and telephone number of an
agency employee who may be contacted about
the rule; and
(i) the signature of the agency head or
designee.
The notice received by counsel for Williams contained little more
than a statement

indicating

that the Commission did not have

jurisdiction to regulate one-way paging services.

To constitute

a valid notice, the notice must contain the items prescribed in
the statute.

The Commission failed to give such a notice to

Williams and other interested parties.

It follows that its pur-

ported action is void and should be vacated.
II.
THE PUBLIC SERVICE COMMISSION ERRONEOUSLY
CONCLUDED THAT, DESPITE A LONG HISTORY OF
REGULATING ONE-WAY PAGING SERVICES, IT COULD
DECLARE BY ADMINISTRATIVE FIAT A CHANGE IN THE
LAW SO AS TO ELIMINATE ITS CONTINUING
JURISDICTION OVER SUCH COMPANIES
A.
No Cogent Reasons Support Reversing the
Commission's Long-Standing Regulation of One-Way Paging.
In Williams, the Court was not required to reach the
substantive question of under what circumstances, if any, the
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Commission

could,

after

complying

with

all

procedural

requirements, change existing substantive rules upon which the
public had come to rely without revisiting the legislature to
obtain authority to do so.

That issue was addressed, however, in

Husky Oil Co. v. State Tax Commission, 556 P.2d 1268 (Utah 1976).
The Utah State Tax Commission had promulgated a regulation in
1937 which exempted certain business transactions from sales tax.
In 1971, after having complied with all applicable procedural
requirements, the Utah Tax Commission by regulation reversed its
long-standing position and eliminated the exemption.

This Court

reversed the Utah Tax Commission and set aside the de-exemption
regulation, stating:
Also, the Commission's S-38 Regulation
which interpreted the statute in question for
34 years to allow for an exemption of a sale
such as the one in this case adds strength to
retention of that exemption. The
Commission's conclusion in the brief on
appeal 'that administrative agencies .
are free to depart from prior determinations'
is not persuasive in this case. Said brief
cites an opinion from this Court to buttress
its conclusion, which on its facts is not
controlling here. Justice Ellett does cite
in that opinion, 73 C.J.S. Public Administrative Bodies and Procedure Section 148, in
which it is stated that . . . administrative
bodies are not ordinarily bound by their
prior determinations . . . . But said Section
148 continues as follows:
However, prior determinations are
entitled to great weight . . . and radical departures
from
administrative
interpretation
consistently
followed
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cannot be made except for most cogent
reasons.
The Commission has made radical departures from an interpretation unchangingly
followed by it for more that three decades.
And, in addition to matters already discussed, the inclusion of language in the
current S-38(C) regulation, supra, does not
infuse cogency into the reasons for those
departures.
556 P.2d at 1271 (Emphasis added).
The Commission has consistently and continually exercised jurisdiction over one-way paging services for more than two
decades.

The only reason profferred by the Commission for its

drastic change in course is its assertion that "one-way paging
service does not fall within the definition of a "telephone corporation" in that one-way paging does not utilize a "telephone
line".

In view of twenty years of contrary interpretation of the

statute, and the reliance placed on that interpretation by all
certificate holders, this reason does not rise to the level of
"cogency" called for in Husky Oil.

The Commission failed to

indicate any substantive policy considerations which called for
deregulation or exemption, nor did it point to any circumstances
which, in the public interest, would require the same.
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B.
The Commission is Estopped From Reversing
Lonq-Standinq Practice of Regulating Paging Services,
The principle of equitable estoppel

Its

"may be applied

against the State, even when acting in a governmental capacity,
if necessary to prevent manifest injustice, and the exercise of
governmental powers will not be impaired as a result . . . ."
Celebrity Club, Inc. v. Utah Liquor Control Commission,
602 P.2d 689, 694 (Utah 1979).
In Celebrity Club, Inc., appellant sought to establish
a club licensed

to serve alcohol.

A statute prohibited the

granting of a liquor license to any facility located within a
600-foot radius of a public or private school.

Upon inquiry,

appellant was advised by the Utah Liquor Control Commission that
it would not be in violation of the statute by reason of the
club's location.

In reliance of the Liquor Control Commission's

representation, appellant expended a substantial sum of money to
complete

its club.

The Liquor Control Commission thereafter

denied the appellant's request for a liquor license on the ground
that a different interpretation of the statute placed its club
within 600 feet of a school.
On appeal, this Court found the Liquor Control Commission

to be

equitably

estopped

from denying

the application,

stating:
The elements essential to invoke the doctrine of equitable estoppel are:
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(1) An admission, statement, or act inconsistent with
the claim afterwards asserted,
(2) action by the other party on the faith of such
admission, statement, or act, and
(3) injury to such other party on the faith of such
admission, statement or act.
602 P.2d at 694
The application of this three-part test to the instant
action shows that the Commission is estopped from denying its
authority to regulate one-way paging services.

The Commission

granted certificates of public convenience and necessity for the
offering of paging services to Williams, who in reliance thereon
has expended in excess of one million dollars to develop a full
service, sophisticated paging service which he would not have
done but for the certificates he received. 3 In a hearing held
before the Commission on November 7, 1983, the following dialogue
took place:
Q. (By Mr. Burbidge) Would you have undertaken to establish this vast network of
transmission facilities had you not received
a certificate of convenience and necessity
from the Commission to operate as a public
utility in the paging business?
•

• •

3 Record of Case No. 19867 at 842-43. While this is not in the
Record of this action, we request this Court to take judicial
notice of the Record in the Williams case since all parties present in this suit were present in the former action.
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A. (By Mr. Williams) I absolutely would not
have invested.
(R. of Case No. 19867 at 185-86).

Williams has been required to

comply with the rules and regulations promulgated by the Commission for regulated utilities.

(R. of Case No. 19867 at 400).

Williams has been required to file and act in accordance with
published tariffs, subject to approval and enforcement by the
Commission.

(R. of Case No. at 400).

Petitioner Williams also

has been required to pay sales tax upon its services premised
solely upon its status as a public utility.
Service Commission, 720 P.2d at 776.

Williams v. Public

Williams extended service

to geographic areas which are less profitable in order to provide
full service to the general public, a service which it would not
have otherwise provided.

(R. of Case No. 19867 at 844-45).

As a

result of the rule change by the Commission, Williams has suffered, and will continue to suffer injury as a direct result of
his reliance in good faith on the Commission's 20 year history of
regulating paging services.

In Celebrity Club, this Court stat-

ed:
The doctrine of equitable estoppel is
properly applicable in a case such as this,
otherwise the whim of an administrative body
could bankrupt an applicant
who acted in good faith in reliance upon a
solemn written commitment.
•

*

*

The conduct of government should always
be scrupulously just in dealing with its
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citizens; and where a public official, acting
within his authority and with knowledge of
the pertinent facts, has made a commitment
and the party to whom it was made has acted
to his detriment in reliance on that commitment, the official should not be permitted to
revoke that commitment. State v. Sponburqh,
66 Wash. 2d 135, 401 P.2d 635, 640 (1965).
602 P.2d at 689.

It follows that the Commission is estopped from

taking its purported action as a matter of law.
III.
THE COMMISSION'S ATTEMPT TO DEREGULATE PAGING
SERVICES BY ADOPTING RULE NO. 8304 DOES NOT
SATISFY THE STATUTORY REQUIREMENTS FOR EXEMPTING
SUCH SERVICE FROM REGULATION.
A.
Sections 54-8b-2 and 54-8b-3 of Utah Code Ann.
Clarify the Public Service Commission's Authority To Regulate
Public Telecommunication Services and Provide a Specific Procedure for Exempting Services From Regulation.
Utah Code Ann. S§ 54-8b-l, et seg. (Supp. 1985) , was
enacted

by

the Utah

Legislature

to clarify

the Commission's

authority to regulate public telecommunication services, and to
provide a specific procedure for exempting certain services from
regulation.

Prior to enactment of Chapter 8b, the Commission had

interpreted its jurisdiction over the telecommunications industry, as defined by Utah Code Ann. §§ 54-2-1(21), (22) and (30),
to include paging services.

This Court so held in Williams v.

Public Service Commission, supra.
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Despite

active

lobbying

to obtain

an exemption for

paging services by American Paging throughout

the legislative

session in which Chapter 8b was enacted, ioupled with the long
and vigorous regulation by the Commission o^ paging services, the
legislature declined to exempt paging services from application
of the statue.

Instead, the legislature adopted broad defini-

tional language which clarifies and solidifies early interpretations of the Commission

including paging services within the

scope of the regulatory scheme.

Section 54-8b-2, subparagraph

(3) states:
"Public
telecommunications
services"
means the transmission of signs, signals,
writing, images, sounds, messages, data, or
other information of any nature by wire,
radio lightwaves, or other electromagnetic
means offered to the public generally.
Therefore, the legislature has now made clear that the
Commission has jurisdiction over one-way paging services.

The

legislature also for the first time empowered the Commission to
exempt regulated telecommunication services.
was not unfettered.

However, that power

The Legislature imposed specific procedural

and substantive requirements which must be complied with before
the Commission may
These

requirements

exempt
are

any such
set

forth

service

from

regulation.

in

Section

subparagraphs (1) and (2):
(1) The Commission is vested with power and
jurisdiction to partially or wholly exempt from

-17-

54-8b-3,

any requirement of this title, any
telecommunications, corporation or public telecommunication service in this state.
(2) The Commission, on its own initiative or
in response to an application by a
telecommunications corporation or a user of a
public telecommunications service, may, after
public notice and an opportunity for hearing, make
findings and issue an order specifying its
requirements, terms and conditions, exempting any
telecommunication service from any requirement of
this title either for a specific geographic area
or in the entire state if the Commission finds
that the telecommunications corporation or service
is subject to effective competition, that the
customers of the telecommunications corporation or
service have reasonably available alternatives,
and that the the telecommunications corporation or
service does not serve a captive customer base,
and if such exemption is in the public interest.
In determining whether to exempt any telecommunication service from any requirement of this title,
the Commission shall consider all relevant factors
including, but not limited to: (a) the number of
other providers offering similar services; (b) the
intrastate market power and market share within
the State of Utah of the telecommunications corporation requesting exemption; (c) the intrastate
market power and market share of other providers;
(d) the existence of other providers to make
functionally equivalent services readily available
at competitive rates, terms and conditions; (e)
the effect of exemption of the regulated revenue
requirements of the telecommunications corporation
requesting an exemption; (f) the ease of entry of
other providers into the market place; (g) the
overall impact of exemption on the public interest; (h) the integrity of all service providers in
their proposed market; (i) the cost of providing
such service; (j) the economic impact on existing
telecommunications corporations; and (k) whether
competition will promote the provision of adequate
service at just and reasonable rates.
(Emphasis added).
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Thus, in enacting Chapter 8b, the legislature has, for
the first time, granted statutory authority to the Commission to
deregulate by exemption.4 At the same time, the statute requires
that the Commission meticulously follow both procedural and substantive requirements in order for the exemption to be valid.
The Commission has failed both to provide adequate notice and
opportunity for hearing to interested parties, and to show that
it considered all of the factors identified by the statute in
arriving at its decision.

Indeed, it considered none of them.

No order has been issued indicating the Commission's findings,
nor the requirements, terms and conditions for exemption.

Absent

compliance with these statutory requirements, the Commission's
attempt to declare itself unable to regulate one-way paging services is invalid.
B.
Section 54-8b-9 does not Affect the Applicability
of Other Sections of Chapter 8b to One-way Paging Services.
In ruling on American Paging's Motion to Dismiss for
lack of jurisdiction, the Commission concluded that Chapter 8b of
the Public Utilities Act does not expand the jurisdiction of the
Commission to include one-way paging.

(R. at 236).

This con-

clusion was apparently based on a premise that the Commission did

4 Due to the enactment of Utah Code Ann. §§ 54-8b-l e_t seq.
(Supp. 1985), the applicability of the Administrative Rulemaking
Act to this situation is in serious question. Indeed, there is
no question that the amendment was in effect at the time of the
Commission's actions and should have controlled.
-19-

not

already

have

jurisdiction

(a premise

flatly

rejected

in

Williams) and on Section 54-8b-9 which provides:

"Nothing in

this

reduce

chapter

Commission's

shall

be

construed

jurisdiction

over

to

enlarge

the services

or

the

and entities for

which jurisdiction is provided or excluded by other provisions of
this title."
The Commission's argument is misplaced for the following reasons:
1.

The Commission's interpretation of Section 54-8b-9

robs Section 54-8b-2 of any meaning whatsoever.

At very minimum,

Section 54-8b-2 must be read as a clarification of prior definitions.

Furthermore, the other provisions of the title had been

long construed by the Commission to embrace and require regulation of paging services.
2.
legislative

Any possible ambiguity
history

created

by

the

is laid to rest by the
acts of American Paging.

Knowing that paging service was specifically included within the
definitions

contained

in

the

new

chapter,

American

Paging

actively lobbied throughout the legislative session in which this
statute was enacted by the legislature

to obtain

statutory exemption applicable to paging services.

a specific
These Ameri-

can Paging efforts were made with the knowledge of and in the
presence

of

Chairman

Cameron.
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The

legislature

resolutely

rejected these attempts to read out of the statutory definition,
by specific exemption, one-way paging services,
3.

(R. at 230,231)

Even assuming arguendo that Section 54~8b-9 pre-

vented the 54-8b-2 definitions from meaning anything, it would
not avail the Commission in this case because this Court ruled in
the Williams case that paging

services has been

a regulated

service in the State of Utah under the provisions of the statues
as they existed prior to the 1985 amendments.
Therefore,

for

the

above

stated

reasons,

Section

54-8b-9 does not prevent the application of Chapter 8b to one-way
paging services.
IV.
THE COMMISSION'S RULE DEPRIVES PETITIONER AND
OTHER CERTIFICATE HOLDERS OF THEIR PROPERTY
WITHOUT COMPENSATION IN VIOLATION OF THE
RIGHT TO DUE PROCESS OF LAW.
A

utility's

certificate

of

public

convenience

necessity constitutes a valuable property right.
Hoelsken, 162 Colo. 142, 425 P.2d

at

and

Schlagel v.

39, 42, cert, denied

Hoelsken v. Public Utilities Commission, 389 U.S. 827 (1967); See
also City of St. George v. Public Service Commission, 565 P.2d 72
(Utah 1977),

Likewise, the certificates of public convenience

and necessity issued by the Commission to Williams are valuable
property rights —

unless, of course Rule No. 8304 is allowed to

stand in which case the certificates will be rendered worthless.

-21-

The Commission's Rule No. 8304 exempting one-way paging
services from regulation effectively voids the certificates held
by Williams thereby depriving him of his property rights without
just compensation as required by substantive principles of due
process.

U.S. Const. Amend. 5; U.S. Const. Amend. 14; Utah

Const. Art 1, § 7.
CONCLUSION
For the reasons set forth above, the Commission's Rule
No. 8304 should be vacated.

Similarly, the Commission's Order-

issued in Case No. 85-2007-01 should be reversed.
RESPECTFULLY

SUBMITTED

this

day

of

September,

1986.
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MICHAEL L. LARSEN
of and for
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David R. WILLIAMS, dba Industrial
Communications, Petitioner,
The PUBLIC SERVICE COMMISSION
OF UTAH, Brent H. Cameron, Chairman; David R. Irvine, Commissioner;
James M. Byrne, Commissioner, Respondents.
MOBILE TELEPHONE, INC., a
corporation, Petitioner,
•.

The PUBLIC SERVICE COMMISSION
OF UTAH, Brent H. Cameron, Chairman, David R. Irvine, Commissioner,
James M. Byrne, Commissioner, Respondents.
Nos. 19867, 19873.
Supreme Court of Utah.
March 4, 1986.
Appeal was taken from order of the
Public Service Commission holding that
Commission had no authority to regulate
one-way mobile telephone paging services.
The Supreme Court, Zimmerman, J., held
that Public Service Commission's decision
that no certificate of public convenience
and necessity was necessary to operate
one-way mobile telephone paging service,
announced in letter to prospective operator,
was a "rule" within meaning of Administrative Rule Making Act so that Commission was required to follow Act's procedural requirements.
Vacated and remanded.
1. Telecommunications ^='461
Public Service Commission's decision
that no certificate of public convenience
and necessity was necessary to operate
one-way mobile telephone paging service,
announced in letter to prospective operator,
was a "rule" within meaning of Administrative Rule Making Act [U.C.A.1953, 6346-3(4) (Repealed)], so that Commission
was required to follow Act's procedural

requirements. U.C.A.1953, 54-1-1 et seq
54-1-li, 54-7-1.5, 54-7-13, 63-46a-l et
seq., 63t-46a-2(8), 63-46a-3(3Xa), 63-46a-4;
U.C.A.1953, 63-46-1, 63-46-3(4), 63-46-5
(Repealed); Const. Art. 1, § 7, U.S C.A
Const.Amend. 14.
Sei publication Words and Phrases
for other judicial constructions and
definitions.
2. Telecommunications $=>461
Commissioners on Public Service Commission who had participated in decision
that no certificate of public convenience
was required to operate one-way mobile
telephone paging service, announced in letter to prospective operator, would not be
precluded from considering the jurisdictional matted on remand on basis that they had
violated statutory prohibitions against ex
parte communications, where prospective
operator was not party to any proceeding
pending before Commission at time letter
was issufed. U.C.A.1953, 54-7-1.5.

Keith E. Taylor, F. Robert Reeder, Michael L. Larsen, Brinton R. Burbidge, Salt
Lake City, for petitioner.
David L. Stott, Stuart L. Poelman, Salt
Lake Citjy, for intervenor Amer. Paging.
Stephen R. Handle, Salt Lake City, for
Page Amer.
David L. Wilkinson, Atty. Gen., Craig
Rich, Ass^t. Atty. Gen., Salt Lake City, for
respondents.
ZIMMERMAN, Justice:
Petitioners Industrial Communications
and Mobile Telephone, Inc., appeal from an
order of the Utah Public Service Commission ("Commission") holding that the Commission has no authority to regulate oneway mobile telephone paging services. Petitioners allege, inter alia, that the Commission (^id not follow proper administrative procedures in concluding that it lacked
jurisdiction We agree that the Commission failed to adhere to proper requirements in ruling on the jurisdictional issue,
and accordingly reverse and remand for a
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m
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new hearing that comports with the applicable statutes.
Understanding the history of the Commission's assertion of regulatory authority
over one-way paging services is important
to this case. In 1962, the Commission
granted a certificate of public convenience
and necessity to operate both a two-way
mobile telephone system and a one-way
paging service to petitioner Mobile Telephone, Inc. By this action, and without
objection from any party, the Commission
assumed jurisdiction over both oneway
paging and two-way mobile telephone services under sections 54-2-1(21), (22), and
(30) of the Code.1 Between 1962 and 1983
the Commission granted similar dual authority certificates to three other companies. In 1974, the Commission granted to
Mobile Telephone of Southern Utah, Inc., a
single authority certificate covering only
oneway paging service. From the record,
it appears that the Commission has, on
occasion, denied requests for certificates
for oneway paging authority. Until 1983,
however, the Commission's authority to
regulate oneway paging services was not
questioned.
In the early 1980's, the Federal Communications Commission deregulated radio
frequencies for use in paging services.
Sixty-nine channels were made available in
1. U.C.A., 1953, § 54-2-1(30) (Repl. Vol. 6A,
1974), states in part: "The term 'public utility'
includes every . . . telephone corporation . . .
where the service is performed for, or the commodity delivered to the public generally
"
Subsection (22) states:
The term "telephone corporation" includes every corporation and person, their lessees,
trustees and receivers or trustees appointed
by any court whatsoever, owning, controlling,
operating or managing any telephone line for
public service within this state.
Subsection (21) states:
The term "telephone line" includes all conduits, ducts, poles, wires, cables, instruments
and appliances, and all other real estate and
fixtures and personal property owned, controlled, operated or managed in connection
with or to facilitate communication by tele
phone whether such communication is had
with or without the use of transmission wires.
2. See 47 C.F.R. 22.501(a)(1) and (4), (d) and
(p)(l) (1983).

Utah on a first-come, first-served basis.2
Page America, Inc., American Paging, Inc.,
and United Paging Corporation each received a permit from the Federal Communications Commission to operate on one of
the new frequencies early in 1983.3 In
May of 1983, American Paging's attorney
contacted Commissioner Irvine to inquire
whether American Paging could operate a
one-way paging system without a certificate. At the request of this attorney, Commissioner Irvine discussed the issue with
the other commissioners. Thereafter, the
Commission sent a letter to the attorney
for American Paging, dated June 3, 1983,
stating that in the Commission's opinion, no
certificate was required. It added that the
Commission would not request a hearing
on the issue.4 That letter is the basis of
the controversy here.
In August of 1983, Page America applied
for a certificate to operate a paging service; petitioner Industrial Communications
protested the application. The Commission
scheduled a public hearing on the application for December of 1983, indicating its
desire to "review" its jurisdiction over oneway paging services. Page America later
moved for a determination that it was exempt from regulation. The Commission
scheduled a hearing on that motion for
November 7th.
3. After receiving its permit from the FCC, United Paging Corporation applied to the Commission for a certificate of convenience and necessity, which application was pending at the time
of the Commission's hearing now under review.
United Paging did not take part in that hearing
and its present status is not apparent from the
record.
4. The letter read in pertinent part:
Inasmuch as American Paging of Utah is proposing to offer only one-way paging service,
rather than telephone service as defined in the
Utah Code, it does not appear necessary for
your client to file an application for a certificate of public convenience and necessity. As
a matter of policy the Commission does not
construe its jurisdiction on an informal basis,
but deems the statute sufficiently clear on its
fact that it would not, on its own motion.
require a hearing with respect to your proposed operation.
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Meanwhile, American Paging had begun
operations without a certificate in reliance
on the Commission's June letter declinmg
to exercise jurisdiction. Industrial Communications therefore asked the Commission
to issue a cease and desist order to stop
American Paging from operating without a
certificate. A hearing on the cease and
desist request was held October 24, 1983.
At that hearing, the Commission admitted
it was in a dilemma inasmuch as it had
"contradicted itself somewhat by the issuance of the June 3rd, 1983 letter." The
Commission refused to order American
Paging to stop operations; however, it ordered American Paging not to accept new
customers until after the November hearing on Page America's certificate at which
the jurisdictional issue would be reviewed.
Following the November hearing, the
Commission formally ruled that it had no
jurisdiction to regulate one-way paging services, effectively deregulating that field.
The Commission dismissed Page America's
application for a certificate and cancelled
the certificates of Industrial Communications and Mobile Telephone, Inc., to the
extent they authorized one-way paging services. It also cancelled the certificate
granted to Mobile Telephone of Southern
Utah, Inc., authorizing the operation of a
one-way paging system.5
After the ruling, Industrial Communications, which had opposed deregulation,
sought a reversal of the Commission's order and a disclosure of ex parte communications relating to the jurisdictional issue.
It also moved for a rehearing before a
commission pro tempore, claiming that by
virtue of the June letter to American Paging, the Commission had prejudged the jur5. Two companies not participating in the hearing still hold certificates of convenience and
necessity for one way paging services.
6. Section 54-1-1.6 of the Code, enacted in 1983
(1983 Utah Laws ch 246, § 5), provides for a
commissioner pro tempore to be appointed by
the governor when a commissioner is "temporarily dismissed or disqualified " Commissioners pro tern shall have the qualifications re
quired for public service commissioners.
7. The Utah Rule Making Act was repealed and
replaced in its entirety after the facts giving rise

isdictional issues.* The Commission ac
kno>(vledged the June letter and the contacts leading up to it, but refused to set
aside its order for any reason On appeal.
Industrial Communications and Mobile
Telephone, Inc., challenge the Commission's actions.
Tl|e principal procedural point raised by
petitioners is that the Commission's June
letter effectively operated to relinquish the
Commission's jurisdiction over one-way
paging, and stripped petitioners and their
similarly situated competitors of a valuable
property right—their certificates. Petitioners argue that under the provisions of the
Utah Administrative Rule Making Act, the
hearing provisions of the Public Service
Commission Act, and the due process clauses ojf state and federal constitutions, the
Jun^ letter constituted a de facto rule making Which required that all interested parties be given proper notice and an opportunity to be heard. See U.C.A., 1953, § 6346-5 (2nd Repl. Vol. 7A, 1978); U.C.A.,
1951 § 54-7-13 (Repl. Vol. 6A, 1974); Utah
Const, art I, § 7; and U.S. Const amend.
XIV,
[lj We first inquire whether the Commission's actions complied with the procedural requirements of the statutes governing agency rule making or agency adjudication. Any state agency promulgating a
rule must follow the procedures specified
in t^at act. U.C.A., 1953, § 63-46-1 (2nd
Kept Vol. 7A, 1978).7 A rule is defined as
a "Statement of general applicability . . .
that implements or interprets the law or
prescribes the policy of the agency in the
administration of its functions
"
U.C.A., 1953, § 63-46-3(4) (2nd Repl. Vol.
to this action occurred Our conclusion would
noi be any different were we to analyze this
ca$e under the new statute. 1985 Utah Laws ch
15^, § 2. The statute now requires rule making
whenever "agency actions affect a class of per
sons" and defines a rule as "a statement made
by an agency that applies to a general class of
persons
[which] implements or interprets
po icy made by statute
" U.C A, 1953,
§ to-46a-3(3)(a), -2(8) (2nd Repl Vol 7A. 1978
and Supp 198S)
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7A, 1978). The Public Utilities Act, also
relied on by petitioners, requires that the
Commission give notice and hold a hearing
before it alters, amends, or rescinds an
order or decision. U.C.A., 1953, § 54-7-13
(Repl. Vol. 6A, 1974). Petitioners claim
that the procedural requirements of at
least one of these statutes apply here because the June letter constituted either a
"rule" within the meaning of the Rule Making Act, or an "order" within the meaning
of the Public Utilities Act.
The Commission argues that the June,
1983, letter was not a rule making within
the meaning of the Utah Rule Making Act
because it did not have general applicability. The Commission also argues that because it had never formally determined
that it had jurisdiction to regulate paging
services under the Public Utilities Act, it
was free to announce its opinion on the
subject without any procedural formalities.
There is no merit to the Commission's arguments.
As an initial matter, we note that the
Utah Administrative Rule Making Act
seems most directly on point here. It deals
in some specificity with matters that the
Public Utilities Act covers only inferentially, and the Rule Making Act's provisions do
not appear inconsistent with the earlier enacted utility statute.
The pivotal question is whether the decision announced by the Commission in the
June letter amounted to a rule. It might
be argued that the Commission's action
here is merely legitimate law development
through adjudication as opposed to rule
making. We acknowledge that there is a
variance of opinion on when an agency is
engaged in rule making and must follow
formal rule making procedures, and when
an agency may legitimately proceed by
way of adjudication. See, e.g., NLRB v.
Wyman-Gordon Co., 394 U.S. 759, 89 S.Ct.
1426, 22 L.Ed.2d 709 (1969); and NLRB v.
Bell Aerospace Co., 416 U.S. 267, 94 S.Ct.
1757, 40 L.Ed.2d 134 (1974). However, we
think that there are some fundamental
8.

For these reasons, section 54-7-1.5, governing
the functions of the Commission when entering

points of reference in this area of the law
that are of assistance in determining
whether the Commission should have proceeded by formal rule making Professor
Davis summarized some of these considerations.
Although a retroactive clarification of
uncertain law may be brought about
through adjudication, according to [SEC
v. Cheney Corp., 332 U.S. 194 [67 S.Ct.
1575, 91 L.Ed. 1995 (1947) ] and its many
progency . . . , the problem may be different when an agency through adjudication
makes a change in clear law, as when it
overrules a batch of its own decisions,
especially if private parties have acted in
reliance on the overruled decisions.
2 K. Davis, Administrative Law Treatise
§ 7:25, at 122 (2d ed. 1978). Interpreting
the definition of "rule" contained in section
63-46-3(4), in light of these considerations,
leads us to the conclusion that the Commission was engaged in rule making and had
to follow the requirements of the Utah
Administrative Rule Making Act.8
First, the Commission's decision was
generally applicable: by deregulating the
one-way paging market and permitting
open competition in the market, the decision altered the rights of all certificate
holders, despite their explicit reliance on
the Commission's prior interpretation Second, the letter interpreted the scope of the
Commission's statutory regulatory powers,
thus "interpreting] the law," within the
meaning of the Rule Making Act. Moreover, in so acting the Commission, in the
words of Professor Davis, made a "change
in clear law." For over twenty years, the
Commission has interpreted its authority
over telephone corporations to include oneway paging services. It has required certificate holders to file tariffs and pay public
utility sales taxes. It has denied some"
requests for certificates. In one case, it
issued a certificate that covered only oneway paging. In Medic-Call, Inc v. Public
Service Commission, 24 Utah 2d 273, 470
P.2d 258 (1970), the Commission even went
an order, has no application to the June letter
or the proceedings leading up to its issuance
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to court to defend its jurisdiction over paging services.*
Under all these circumstances, we conclude that the Commission cannot reverse
its long-settled position regarding the scope
of its jurisdiction and announce a fundamental policy change without following the
requirements of the Utah Administrative
Rule Making Act. See, e.g., Ford Motor
Co. v. FTC, 673 F.2d 1008 (9th Cir.1981),
cert, denied, 459 U.S. 999, 103 S.Ct. 358, 74
L.Ed.2d 394 (1982); see also 2 K. Davis,
Administrative Law Treatise § 7:25, at
125 (2d ed.1978). These requirements were
not met. Nonparties were not given notice
of the Commission's intention to reconsider
its long-held position in connection with the
June letter. And the November adjudicative hearing certainly cannot be considered
an adequate substitute for a rule making
proceeding. Many of the protections provided for by the Act were missing from
that proceeding, including adequate advance notices to all affected parties, an
opportunity to participate, and an opportunity to comment on the proposed rule.
U.C.A., 1953, § 63-46a-4 (2d Repl. Vol. 7A,
1978, Supp.1985). Because the requirements of the Act were not satisfied, the
rule is vacated and the matter is remanded
for further proceedings.
[2] The next issue is whether the current commissioners should be precluded
from considering the jurisdictional matter
on remand. Petitioners contend that the
commissioners who participated in the decision announced in the June letter had prejudged the jurisdictional issue. Therefore,
they request that we order the recusal of
all the commissioners and the appointment
of a commission pro tempore.
Petitioners assert that recusal is necessary because the opinion announced in the
June letter violated the statutory prohibitions against ex parte communication
about matters pending before the Commission. Section 54-7-1.5 provides in part:
9. This Court ruled in Medic Call that the PSC
could have no jurisdiction over a private nonprofit paging service because it was not a public
utility. We did not reach the issue of whether a

No member of the public service commission . . . shall make or knowingly cause
to be made to any party any communication relevant to the merits of any matter
under adjudication unless notice and an
opportunity to be heard are afforded to
all parties. No party shall make or
knowingly cause to be made to any member of the commission . . . an ex parte
communication relevant to the merits of
any matter under adjudication.
Th^re are several problems with petitioners' Argument. By its terms the statute
does not apply to dealings between the
Commission and American Paging. In
May land June of 1983, American Paging
was Jiot a party to any proceeding pending
befor^ the Commission that involved the
question of the Commission's jurisdiction
over jone-way paging services. Moreover,
the letter was not an adjudication but, in
substance, a rule making, as we have noted
abov^. Therefore, any dealings between
American Paging and the commissioners
could not be a communication between a
"party" and a member of the Commission
"relevant to the merits" of "any matter
under adjudication." Second, section 54-71.5 was not effective until July 1, 1983,
almost a month after the letter was written. See 1983 Utah Laws ch. 246, § 15.
It is true that the later proceedings before the Commission on the application of
Page I America for a certificate should be
classified as an "adjudication" within the
meaning of section 54-7-1.5, and that these
proceedings occurred after the effective
date ()f the statute. However, that does
not change the nature of the May and June
comm|unications between the Commission
and A(merican Paging nor the fact that the
statute, by its terms, does not apply to
them.
Because the jurisdictional issue likely
will b£ resolved by a rule making proceeding orj remand and will obviate the need for
further proceedings, we need not further
publicly available paging service, such as pen
tioners here operate, would be a public utility
because our holding was limited to the private
natufe of the arrangements before us
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consider whether and under what circumstances recusal may be required in administrative adjudications when the specific provisions of section 54-7-1.5 do not apply.
Plainly, having participated in a rule making proceeding does not automatically preclude a commissioner from participating in
a later, properly conducted adjudication.
We have considered the other issues
raised and find their disposition unnecessary to the result. The Commission's rule
is of no force and effect, and its order is
vacated. The matter is remanded for proceedings consistent with this opinion.
HALL, CJ., and STEWART, HOWE and
DURHAM, JJ., concur.
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Jose Antonio LOPEZ, Plaintiff
and Appellant,
v.
Fred C. SCHWENDIMAN, Chief, Driver
License Services, Utah Department of
Public Safety, Defendant and Respondent
No. 20112.
Supreme Court of Utah.
June 12, 1986.
Utah State Driver License Division revoked driving privileges of driver for period of one year. The Seventh District
Court, Carbon County, Richard C. Davidson, J., affirmed the administrative decision. Driver appealed. The Supreme
Court, held that: (1) statute providing for
arrest of one "in actual physical control" of
vehicle while under the influence of alcohol
and/or drugs was intended by legislature
to protect public safety and apprehend
drunken driver before he or she strikes and
may not be construed to exclude those

whose vehicles are presently immobile because of mechanical trouble, and (2) driver's refusal to submit to breath test upon
rumors that there had been incidents of
tampering with breathalyzer in the past
was nevertheless refusal, subjecting defendant to license revocation.
Affirmed.
1. Automobiles e»144.2(9)
In revocation proceeding, Driver Division has burden to show that operator of
vehicle was in actual physical control of
motor vehicle and that arresting officer
had grounds to believe that operator was
under influence of alcohol.
2. Automobiles e=>144.2(10)
In trial de novo, district court must
determine by preponderance of evidence
whether driver's license was subject to revocation for driving under the influence of
alcohol. U.C.A.1953, 41-6-44.10.
3. Automobiles <S=>144.2(3)
Supreme Court's review of district
court's determination as to whether driver's license was subject to revocation for
driving while under the influence of alcohol
is deferential to trial court's view of evidence unless trial court has misapplied
principles of law or its findings are clearly
against weight of evidence.
4. Automobiles <3=*144.1(1)
Even if truck was inoperable at time
that licensee was found sleeping in it and
arrested, that would not preclude him from
having "actual physical control" over truck
so that his driver's license could be revoked
if he had statutorily prohibited blood alcohol content. U.C.A.1953, 41-6-44.10(1, 2).
5. Automobiles <s=>349
Statute providing for arrest of one "in
actual physical control" of vehicle while
under the influence of alcohol and/or drugs*
was intended by legislature to protect public safety and apprehend drunken driver
before he or she strikes and may not be
construed to exclude those vehicles are
presently immobile because of mechanical

APPENDIX

B

State of Utah
Administrative Rule Analysis
Notice of Proposed Rule/Change

Office of Administrative Rules
tfe Archives Building, State Capitol
Salt Lake City, Utah 84114
Telephone 533-4647

Department:

P u b

008304
AGENCY FILE-NUMBER

i i c s e r v i c e Commission o f Utah

Agency:

^

Address:

160 E a s t 300 S o u t h , SLC, Utah

Contact Person: David L. S t o t t or Joe Dunlop
Telephone: 5 3 0 - 6 7 1 6

SHORT TITLE OF RULE

Commission jurisdiction over one-way paging services
3RIEF SUMMARY OF RULE OR CHANGE AND REASON FOR IT

•

The Public Service Commission of Utah doe$ not have jurisdiction
>ver one-way paging services. The reason foi: the | rule is thfct one-way
waging service does not -fall within the-def iriitl-onrof a* "telephone^ ~
:orporationH in that such service does not utilise a "telephone line".

ANTICIPATED COST IMPACT OF RULE — UCA 63-46a-4(3)(d)

No c o s t

impact

TYPE OF NOTICE
PROPOSED RULE (NEW, AMEND OR REPEAL)

O 120-DAY RULE - UCA S3-46a-7

CHANGE IN PROPOSED RULE (CHANGES PROPOSED RULE NUMBER

•

FiVS-YEAR REVIEW/CONTINUATION

JUSTIFICATION FOR 120-DAY RULE CHECKED ABOVE

^ "^Lf ^I"^5^^ S I A T ^ C O D E ( ^ , T A T '5 > r l ) i54-4 r i jl J^^SiaE^eme^ jcbxart Case No. 19367
D RULE REQUIRES BY FEDERAL MANDATE (U.S. CODE OR FED. REGISTER ClTATIOl
$

PU8UC MAY PARTICIPATE (N RULEMAKING BY:
PUBLIC HEARING
VTE:

XJ WRITTEN COMMENT

U APPEARANCE AT

UNT,

AGENCY U N T I L

TIME:

^Kay/,

1936

ACE:
NOTE: PUBLIC MAY REQUEST HEARING IN ACCORDANCE WITH UCA 63-46a-5(1)(b)
•\E FULL TEXT OF ALL PROPOSED ADMINISTRATIVE RULES OR RULE CHANGES IS PUpLISHED IN THE UTAH STATE BULLETIN UNLESS
<CLUDED BECAUSE OF LENGTH AND SPACE LIMITATION. THE FULL TEXT MAY BE INSPECTED AT THE AGENCY (ADDRESS ABOVE) OR
FFICE OF ADMINISTRATIVE RULES.
AUTHORIZATION

9. OFFICE OF ADMINISTRATIVE RULES

tfarch
IGNATURE OF AGENCY H £ A D O R D t S K i N E E

Brent H. Cameron, Chairman
• Afcje / T v o c n i

13,

]|936>recEi\fccrBY;
M3ATE.

DATE

?SC o f
AGENCY

Utah

3-25-86

TIME:

" 120-OAY RULE EFFECTIVE:* NA.* ^ # > . ' , : 1 2 0 - 6 A V RULE LAPSES:

NA r^r;

BRENTH.CAMERON ~ - < ~ ^ '
JAMES M. BYRNE
MEMORANDUM

BR|AN t

^ ^

m

<•'.//?/T

r 1'
<•///,,

TO:
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FROM:

Joe Dunlop

DATE:

May 16, 1986

RE:

RULE ON ONE-WAY PAGING SERVICES, Case No. 8 6 - 9 9 9 - 0 *

I recommend adoption of t h e one-way paging rule e f f e c t i v e today,
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- BEFORE THE PUBLIC SERVICE COMMISSION OF UTAH In the Matter of the Applica)
tion Of AMERICAN PAGING, INC.
)
(OF UTATO for a Certificate of )
Convenience and Necessity to
)
Operate as a Public Utility
)
Rendering Paging Service to the )
General Public in Areas of Box )
Elder, Weber, Morgan, Davis,
)
Salt Lake, Utah, Summit, Wasatch)
and Tooele Counties, Utah,
)

CASE NO, BS-^OO^-Ql
ORDER GRANTING MOTION
TO DISMTSS

ISSUED:

May H3, 1986

By the Commission:
On or about August 10, 1983, Page America Inc. filed an
application with the Commission to provide one-way paging service.

On November ?8, 1983, however, the Commission ruled that

it had no statutory jurisdiction over paging services.

The case

was subsequently appealed to the Utah Supreme Court.
On or about April 30, 1985 American Paging Inc. (American Paging) filed an application with the Commission to provide
one-way paging service to the general public between points in
Box Elder, Weber, Morgan, Davis, Salt Lake, Utah, Summit, Wasatch
and Tooele Counties within that area.

American Paging filed

simultaneously a Motion to Dismiss its Application for the reason
that the Commission, in its Order of November HC, 1983, had
determined that it did not have jurisdiction to regulate one-way
paging services.

American Paging also stated that although the

1985 Utah Legislature amended the Public Utilities Act by adding
Chapter

8b. empowering

the Commission to wholly or partially

exempt certain competitive telecommunication services or service

CAPE MO. 85-2007-01

providers, said chapter did not expand the Commission's jurisdiction beyond that which it already had.
On or about March 4, 1986, the Utah Supreme Court ruled
that the Commission's deregulation of one-way paging was defective

because

the

Commission

had

attempted

the

deregulation

through an Order construing its jurisdiction rather than through
rulemaking under4 the Administrative Rulemaking Act.
Thereafter,

in

accord

Supreme Court, the Commission

with

the

instruction

of

filed a notice of proposed

the

rule-

making with the Office of Administrative Rules on April 15, 1986,
which stated that the Commission did not have jurisdiction over
one-way paging and the reasons for it.
the

parties.

No

party

requested

Notice was provided

a hearing

within

the

to

15-day

period following publication as required by the Utah Administrative

Rulemaking

Act.

The

rule was

formally

adopted

and

made

effective May 16, 1986.
The Commission
oral

arguments

of

the

further concludes from the comments and
parties

that

Chapter

8B

of

the

Public

Utilities Act of the Utah Code does not expand the jurisdiction
of the Commission to include one-way paging.
Based upon the foregoing, the Commission will make the
following:
ORDER
NOW, THEREFORE, IT IS HEREBY ORDERED, That the Commission, having
Rulemaking

issued a rule pursuant

Act

and

in

accord

with

to the Utah
the

direction

Administrative
of

the

Utah

CAr>E *JQ. B5-2007-01
~ 3 Supreme Court that

it does not have jurisdiction over one-way

paging services and having further determined that Chapter 8B of
the Public Utilities Act does not expand the jurisdiction of the
Commission

to

include

one-way

paging,

hereby

grants

American

Paging's Motion to Dismiss its Application for a Certificate of
Convenience and Necessity to provide one-way paging services.
DATED at Salt Lake City, Utah, this 23rd day o r May,
1986.

/s/ Brent H. Cameron, Chairman
(SEAT,)

/s/ Janes M. Bvrne, Commissioner
/s/ Brian T. Stewart, Commissioner

Attest:
/s/ Georgia B. Peterson, Secretary

